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Abstract
Interest  Rate  rules are  often estimated as simple reaction functions 
linking  the  policy  interest  rate  to  variables  such  as  (forecasted) 
inflation and the output gap; however, the coefficients estimated with 
this  approach  are  convolutions  of  structural  and  preference 
parameters.  I  propose  an  approach  to  estimate  Central  Bank 
preferences  starting  from the  Central  Bank's  optimization  problem 
within a small open economy. When we consider open economies in a 
regime of Inflation Targeting, the issue of the role of the exchange 
rate  in  the  Monetary  Policy  rule  becomes  relevant.  The  empirical 
analysis  is  conducted  on  Sweden,  to  verify  whether  the  recent 
stabilization of  the Krona/Euro exchange rate  was  due to “Fear of 
Floating”;  the  results  show that  the  exchange  rate  might  not  have 
played  a  role  in  monetary  policy,  suggesting  that  the  stabilization 
probably occurred as a result of increased economic integration and 
business cycle convergence. 
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1. Introduction
Interest  rate rules are often estimated as simple reaction functions à la Taylor [1993] rule 
linking the policy interest rate to variables such as future expected inflation and the output 
gap. However, it has been shown by Svennson [1997] that the coefficients estimated with this 
approach are convolutions of structural and preference parameters and thus are subject to the 
Lucas  [1976]  critique.  Extending  the  work  of  Favero  and  Rovelli  [2003],  I  propose  an 
approach to estimate Central Bank preferences starting from the Central Bank's optimization 
problem within  a  small  open economy.  When we consider  open economies  that  are  in  a 
regime of Inflation Targeting, the issue of the role of the exchange rate in the Monetary Policy 
rule  becomes relevant.  In  particular,  it  is  still  widely debated  whether  Inflation  Targeting 
Central Banks should, or do, limit exchange rate flexibility. 
During the last decade, a large body of empirical literature has investigated the tendency of 
Central Banks to adopt de facto policies which are in conflict with the official statements, in 
particular with respect to the exchange rate regime. While, on one hand, there has been a 
tendency to move towards flexible exchange rates1, on the other hand it has been shown2 that 
the same countries still engage in active exchange rate management. The literature on the so-
called “Fear of Floating” has documented on the countries of interest,  in particular, lower 
nominal exchange rate volatility, and higher foreign exchange reserves volatility with respect 
to some benchmark floater. 
Out of the 27 member states of the EU, only 16 have adopted the euro; six have floating 
exchange rates and an Inflation Targeting regime, while the remaining ones adopted some sort 
of exchange rate arrangement vis-à-vis the euro. Nevertheless, the bilateral exchange rates of 
inflation targeters with the euro have remained quite stable over the last decade, and this has 
raised the question of whether they have been – whether voluntarily or not – following the 
ECB policy with the aim of stabilizing the exchange rate3. 
When the country of interest has adopted an Inflation Targeting regime, the results obtained 
using  exchange  rate  regime  classification  techniques  might  be  misleading.  Exchange  rate 
smoothing can come as a side product when the Central Bank targets CPI inflation, and this 
1 See Reinhard and Rogoff [2001].
2 See, for example, Calvo and Reinhard [2002], Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2003], [2005] and [2007], 
Frankel and Wei [2008].
3 See Van Dijk et al. [2005] and Reade and Volz [2009].
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will  depend on the degree of exchange rate  pass-through and the share of imported final 
goods. As it was stated by Clarida [2001], “in practice, a monetary policy aimed at achieving 
only  domestic  objectives  may also serve to stabilize  the exchange rate,  […] and thus  be 
difficult to distinguish from a policy of maintaining the exchange rate within a band”. In other 
words,  an  observational  equivalence  between  Inflation  Targeting  and  Managed  Floating 
regimes arises that makes it hard to correctly classify them.
Moreover,  exchange  rate  stabilization  can  come  as  the  result  of  increased  economic 
integration and business cycle  synchronization,  as suggested by the theory of endogenous 
optimum currency areas (see Frankel and Rose [1998]).
The objective of this  paper is therefore threefold.  First  of  all,  it  aims at  bridging the gap 
between the literature on exchange rate regime classification and that on monetary policy 
rules  estimation.  This,  as  it  was  stated above,  is  done by suggesting an approach for  the 
estimation of Monetary Policy Rules and the identification of Central Bank preferences in a 
small open economy that builds on previous work by Favero and Rovelli [2003] and Collins 
and Siklos [2004]. Rather than limiting ourselves to the estimation of Taylor rules, we take the 
Lucas  [1976]  critique  seriously  by  identifying  separately  the  parameters  describing  the 
structure  of  the  economy  and  those  describing  Central  Bank  preferences,  explicitly 
considering  exchange  rate  smoothing  or  “Fear  of  Floating”  as  one  possible  regime.  The 
second objective is to show, through a simple and stylized theoretical model, how the speed at 
which the real exchange rate converges to the PPP can influence its role in the monetary 
policy rule, an aspect which has not been considered in the literature on monetary policy rules 
estimation, even when the exchange rate is included as a regressor. Third, by using real-time 
data, we explicitly address the critique by Orphanides [2001] and Molodsova et al. [2008] 
who suggested that estimation of policy rules should be run on real time rather than revised 
data.  
The subject of the empirical analysis is Sweden. While, officially, it has been on an Inflation 
Targeting regime since 1995, Sweden exhibited - at least until the economic and financial 
crisis that started at the end of 2008, which put small currencies through a lot of stress – a 
remarkable stability of the bilateral exchange rate of its currency, the Krona, with the Euro. 
For  these  reasons,  it  is  an  obvious  candidate  to  study how to  discern  between  “honest” 
Inflation Targeting which has  exchange rate  stabilization as  a  side product,  and “Fear  of 
Floating”.
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The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the position of Sweden with 
respect to the Euro as well as some stylized facts on the Swedish and Euro Area economy 
during the last 15 years. Section 3 presents a brief review of the related literature. Section 4 
describes  Inflation  Targeting  as  a  monetary  policy  rule,  as  it  has  been  designed  by  the 
economic literature (in particular Svensson [1996]) and the Central Banks' statements during 
the years. Section 5 introduces a simple model for the derivation of interest rate rules in an 
open economy.  In Section 6, a parsimonious structural  model of the Swedish economy is 
estimated, which is the empirical counterpart of the theoretical model in section 5. In Section 
7 we estimate Central Bank preferences corresponding to alternative monetary policy rules, to 
see which one fits best the behaviour of the Swedish Riksbank. Section 8 concludes.
2. Sweden and the Euro
After the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism at the end of 1992, Sweden entered a 
floating exchange rate regime and then formally adopted Inflation Targeting in January 1995.
The  introduction  of  the  euro  in  1999  created  a  huge  debate  in  Sweden,  concerning  the 
adoption of the common currency; the Government decided that the country would not be part 
of  the  leading  group  of  the  Monetary  Union,  because  of  both  political  and  economic 
considerations. The political considerations mainly dealt with the fact that Sweden had joined 
the EU only a few years earlier (in 1995) and the population was supposed not to be “ready” 
to give up their national currency yet. The economic considerations were the result of the 
report of the Calmfors Commission, which had been appointed by the Government to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of joining the Monetary Union for Sweden. In the end, the government 
decided that a national referendum had to be held in order to let the people decide on the 
adoption of the euro. 
In September 2003 the referendum was held, where the majority of voters (56%) rejected the 
proposal of joining the EMU, and since then it has not been clear what Sweden is going to do 
with  the  euro.  In  theory,  it  has  to  join  the  Monetary  Union  sooner  or  later.  In  fact,  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  only  considers  the  opt-out  possibility  for  Denmark  and  the  United 
Kingdom, while other countries and new member states have to join the EMU as soon as they 
fulfill the convergence criteria of the Treaty. Out of the five criteria, in the last few years 
Sweden has fulfilled four, and manages to stay out by not joining ERM II4.
4 The Maastricht Treaty requires that a country that wants to join the EMU has been a member of ERMII 
without realignments of the central parity of the last two years.
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The economic and stock markets crisis that has hit the world since the last quarter of 2008 did 
not leave Sweden untouched. As in all advanced economies, production,  inflation and interest 
rates have been falling; the krona experienced a large depreciation, as most of the other small 
currencies, against  the euro, and the debate on joining the Monetary Union came back to 
relevance.
In particular,  one might  ask to  which extent  the conduct  of  monetary policy in  european 
countries that have not adopted the euro is constrained or influenced by shocks originating in 
the EMU, with which they are highly integrated, and whether they are actually setting their 
monetary policy in step with the ECB, regardless of official policy statements, i.e. whether 
there is some evidence of “Fear of Floating” (Calvo and Reinhard [2002]).
By looking at the graph of the exchange rate of the Swedish Krona vis à vis the Euro, one can 
notice that  the latter  has remained very stable since the adoption of inflation targeting in 
Sweden in 1995, and even more so between january 2002 and september 2008, that is, after 
the euro banknotes and coins were finally introduced5: the bilateral exchange rate remained 
within a band of ± 2.50% around a mean of 9.22 krona per euro (See Figure 1). 
It is also interesting to observe the evolution of the variables describing the Swedish and 
EMU business cycles, namely inflation, output and interest rates. Figures 2-4 show that, since 
the introduction of flexible exchange rates in 1993, the CPI inflation, output gap, and policy 
interest rates in Sweden and the EMU tended to move quite closely together. This is clear also 
from Table 2.1, which reports some correlations on the same variables and also shows how 
exchange  rate  volatility  has  decreased  in  the  last  part  of  the  period,  while  the  other 
correlations have remained quite stable.
The  natural  question  that  arises  is  therefore  the  following:  what  was  the  source  of  the 
stabilization of the SEK/Euro exchange rate? 
5 During the last quarter of 2008 the bilateral exchange rate experienced a large increase in volatility, and the 
Krona  suffered  a  depreciation  of  over  15%.  The  last  months  of  2008  were  characterized  by  a  sharp 
depreciation of minor currencies, and this was aknowledged also by the Riksbank in its Monetary Policy 
report of October 23rd 2008: “The krona has weakened agains almost all of the largest currencies since  
September. It is unclear exactly what this weakening is due to, but in times of great anxiety, small countries'  
currencies are usually regarded as uncertain and they weaken. The krona weakened, for instance, after the  
crises in 1997-98 and (…) in September 2001. This is clear, for instance, from the krona's position against  
the euro (…). The weakening of the trade-weighted krona , which is largely assumed to be due to the current  
crisis, is expected to persist for the remainder of the year(...). After that, the krona will return to more normal  
levels.  (…) A weakening of  the exchange rate usually  has a positive effect  on exports in Sweden”.  The 
Riksbank's report highlights two elements: first, the krona is expected to appreciate when the crisis is over; 
second, the Riksbank is not going to intervene to defend the currency: in a situation of falling inflation and 
falling output, a depreciation of the currency is nothing but good in order to go over the crisis.
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Table 2.1. The business cycle in Sweden and the EMU, 1993-2008
1993.01-1994.12 1995.01-1998.12 1999.01-2001.12 2002.01-2008.12
Output gaps correlation 0.69 0.84 0.81 0.88
Inflation rates correlation -0.71 0.71 0.79 0.70
Policy  rates correlation 0.94 0.82 0.87 0.84
Index of exchange rate 
stability6 0.667 0.865 0.945 0.996
Has the Riksbank actually been limiting the SEK/Euro exchange rate flexibility, despite its 
official  claims  of  being  an  inflation  targeter,  or  is  such  an  exchange  rate  stabilization 
endogenous,  i.e.  the  result  of  an  increasing  convergence  of  EMU and  Swedish  business 
cycles,  so that  “faced with similar data,  the Riksbank and ECB tend to synchronize their  
interest rate decisions: this helps explaining why the exchange rate has been so stable”7?
Apart from alternative exchange rate regimes and arrangements, we can identify four possible 
sources of exchange rate stabilization: two are voluntary and two involuntary. Exchange rate 
volatility can be reduced through direct intervention using foreign exchange reserves or credit 
lines; otherwise, the central bank can stabilize the exchange rate through the policy interest 
rate, changing it in step with the anchor country (an example in this sense is Denmark).
Alternatively, exchange rate stabilization can be the result of a synchronization of monetary 
policy  interventions  that  is  due  to  the  convergence  of  business  cycles,  as  suggested  by 
Giavazzi and Mishkin [2005] for the case of Sweden. Finally, Reade and Volz [2009] suggest 
that Sweden might be unable to run a monetary policy that is independent from that of the 
EMU.  The  authors  investigated  this  issue  by  looking  at  interbank  interest  rates  in  a 
Cointegrated VAR framework and concluded that the two interest rates are cointegrated with 
only the Swedish rate  adjusting,  and this  indicates  that  the Riksbank is,  “de facto,  not  a 
master in its house”8. In other words, since the two Central Banks behave similarly, it should 
not be costly for Sweden to give up its monetary policy independence.
6 Stability of the exchange rate is defined here as the probability that the percentage change, in absolute value, 
of the exchange rate within a given month is lower than 2.25%. The probability is calculated using observed 
monthly exchange rate changes over a two-year rolling window (see also Calvo and Reinhart [2002]).
7  F. Giavazzi, F. Mishkin, (2007) p. 54.
8 Reade and Volz (2009), p. 26.
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Figure 1. SEK-euro Exchange Rate Figure 2. The Output Gap
Figure 3. Policy Interest Rates Figure 4. Inflation Rates
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3. Review of related literature
Since the seminal paper by Taylor [1993], which introduced the use of simple interest rate 
rules for the analysis of monetary policy, a lot of theoretical and empirical research has been 
developed on the issue. According to the “Taylor Rule”, in each period the Central Bank sets 
the interest rate to respond to deviations of inflation from a pre-specified target (in his paper, 
2%) and of output growth from the long-run growth rate of output. 
The original interest rate rule by Taylor has been modified in later empirical and theoretical 
works. In particular, it has been noticed (see, for example, Clarida et al. [1998]) that Central 
Banks respond to  forecasts of inflation rather than current inflation, due to time lags in the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Moreover, interest rates show a high degree of persistence, 
and the fit of estimated interest rate rules can be improved a lot by augmenting the Taylor 
Rule with the lagged policy rate. In this sense, the observed interest rate can be interpreted as 
a weighted average of the target rate and the rate in the previous period; this behaviour has 
been termed  interest rate smoothing and the theoretical justification would be that Central 
Banks  change  their  policy  rates  gradually  in  order  to  avoid  generating  excessive 
macroeconomic volatility. However, the role of the lagged interest rate in the monetary policy 
rule  has  been  challenged  in  several  works  (see  Rudebusch  [2002],  English  [2003], 
Castelnuovo [2007]), suggesting that the persistence of the policy rate might be due to serially 
correlated errors rather than optimal partial adjustment. Recently, Consolo and Favero [2009] 
have shown that the observed inertia in monetary policy, resulting in very high (generally 
between 0.8 and 0.9) coefficients on the lagged policy rate, might be the consequence of a 
weak instrument problem in the GMM estimations performed.
The empirical literature has generally estimated monetary policy reaction functions (in the 
form of forward-looking Taylor [1993] rules)  using a  GMM approach9 (see,  for example, 
Clarida et al. [1998] and [2000]); however, as it was pointed out in Favero and Rovelli [2003], 
since Euler equations are the natural object of the GMM approach, it would be more natural to 
use first order conditions, derived from the Central Bank's optimization problem, to estimate 
the policy rule. Favero and Rovelli [2003] apply this approach for the estimation of Central 
Bank preferences to the U.S. A similar attempt was done by Collins and Siklos [2004] who 
9 To be precise, the GMM approach is used when official forecasts for the inflation rate are not available, and 
therefore least squares estimation of a forward-looking Taylor Rule setting E t πt+k =  πt+k would result in an 
endogenous error term. When the Central Bank's inflation forecasts are available, however, nonlinear least 
squares are suited for the estimation of a forward-looking Taylor Rule with interest  rate smoothing (see 
Castelnuovo [2007] and De Aurelio [2005]).
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estimate Central Bank preferences for Australia, New Zealand and Canada. However, their 
approach suffers from several limitations: first, their empirical analysis heavily relies on HP 
filters;  second,  they solve an infinite-horizon optimization problem which,  although more 
realistic than the finite-horizon approach we adopt in sections 5 and 7, yields results which are 
less comparable to previous works that estimated simple interest rate rules. We believe that 
the finite-time approach adopted here is not an excessive simplification; moreover, it allows 
us to derive an analytical solution to the Central Bank's optimization problem which would 
not be possible otherwise. 
An issue which is not solved is related to the role of the exchange rate in the monetary policy 
rule of inflation targeting Central Banks. According to Svensson [2003] there are no good 
reasons for separate – real or nominal – exchange rate objectives, under flexible inflation 
targeting, at least for advanced economies, while exchange rate smoothing would be more 
motivated for developing countries, which typically have foreign currency-denominated debt 
as well as other financial stability-related problems. At the same time, Svensson [1997] states 
that exchange rate targeting, as well as money growth targeting, would be better than inflation 
forecast targeting as a means to curb inflation only in the case they are sufficient statistics for 
future inflation; if they are not, as it generally happens, then exchange rate and money growth 
targeting lead to worse outcomes10 with respect to inflation forecast targeting. 
The most widespread view in the literature is that the (real) exchange rate, therefore, would 
indeed play a role in the monetary policy rule when the central bank targets CPI inflation, but 
only indirectly, since it is a predictor of future inflation and it also affects the output gap; 
domestic inflation targeting presents worse outcomes in terms of output stabilization (see, for 
example,  Gali  and Monacelli  [2005]  and Svensson [2000]).  Moreover,  Taylor  [2003]  and 
Edwards [2006] discuss that if Central Banks responded directly to exchange rate changes by 
changing the policy interest rate, this would result in excessive interest rate volatility, which is 
not observed in practice. The model outlined in Section 5 will be on the same line, suggesting 
that, indeed, relatively high interest rate variability might be evidence of “fear of floating”, in 
line with what suggested, in a different framework, by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2005]. 
A country that  is  officially on a  flexible  exchange rate  regime but  actively intervenes  to 
reduce the volatility of the exchange rate is said to have  Fear of Floating  (see Calvo and 
Reinhart [2002]). A large body of literature has recently introduced measures of exchange rate 
10 In particular, higher inflation and output variability.
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flexibility11, but only one paper, namely Ball and Reyes [2008], has focused on the challenges 
for exchange rate classification schemes when they are applied to IT countries. However, Ball 
and Reyes [2008] presents two main limits in the analysis of inflation targeting regimes: on 
the theoretical side, they only compare simple instrument rules rather than deriving the policy 
function from an optimizing behaviour of the Central Bank; this limited approach influences 
their  empirical  analysis,  since  they  only  focus  on  how  the  real  interest  rate  responds 
differently  to  current  and  lagged  inflation  and  changes  in  exchange  rate  under  different 
official regimes, rather than estimating a policy rule.
4. Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Regime
Inflation Targeting (henceforth IT) is defined as a monetary policy regime characterized by: 
(i) an explicit inflation target (normally around 2%, with the possibility of some tolerance 
bands  around  the  target);  (ii)  a  framework  for  policy  decisions  called  inflation-forecast  
targeting, which uses an inflation forecast produced by the Central Bank, and made public, as 
an intermediate target for Monetary Policy; and finally, (iii) a high degree of transparency and 
accountability  (see  Svensson  [1996]).  Starting  from the  end  of  the  1980s,  an  increasing 
number  of  countries12,  generally  small  open  economies,  have  adopted  IT  as  the  official 
monetary policy regime. 
Adopting IT does not rule out the possibility that additional objectives, other than inflation 
stabilization,  be  pursued  by  the  Central  Bank,  as  long  as  these  do  not  jeopardize  the 
achievement of the inflation target. The presence of such additional objectives – for example, 
output stabilization and interest rate smoothing – allows us to distinguish between strict and 
flexible IT. 
Official  statements  by  the  main  IT  Central  Banks  make  it  natural  to  regard  IT,  using 
Svensson's [2003] words, as a targeting rule. The Monetary Policy objective of the Bank of 
England is to 
“  [...]  deliver  price  stability  –  low inflation  –  and,  subject  to  that,  to  support  the  Government’s  economic 
objectives including those for growth and employment. Price stability is defined by the Government’s inflation 
target of 2%. […] The Monetary Policy Committee’s aim is to set interest rates so that inflation can be brought 
11 Calvo and Reinhart [2002], Reinhart and Rogoff [2004], Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2003] and [2005], 
Frankel and Wei [2008], just to name a few. In D'Adamo [2009] I have reviewed them and compared the 
results of such different approaches for a sample of 18 European Countries and other advanced economies.
12 To name a few, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Israel.
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back to target within a reasonable time period without creating undue instability in the economy.” 
Similarly, in Australia, which adopted inflation targeting in 1993, the Statement of Conduct of 
Monetary Policy established that
“monetary  policy's  principal  medium-term  objective  is  to  control  inflation.  [...]  The  appropriate  target  for 
monetary policy is to achieve an inflation rate of 2-3 per cent on average, over the cycle [...]. The inflation target  
is defined as a medium-term average rather than as a hard-edged target band within which inflation is to be held 
at all times. This formulation allows for the inevitable uncertainties that are involved in forecasting, and lags in 
the effects  of monetary policy on the economy.  [...]  The inflation target  is,  necessarily,  forward-looking,  as 
evidenced by the operation of monetary policy since its introduction. This approach allows a role for monetary 
policy in dampening the fluctuations in output over the course of the business cycle.” 
Finally, the Swedish Riksbank, which is at the center of the present analysis13, has stated that
“The Riksbank has specified an explicit inflation target whereby the annual change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) is to be 2 per cent with a tolerance interval of plus/minus 1 per cent. Monetary Policy is also guided by 
various measures of “underlying inflation”. There is no single measure of inflation that consistently indicates the 
appropriate stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy acts with a lag and is normally focused on achieving the 
inflation target within a two-year period. The two-year time horizon also provides scope for taking fluctuations in 
the real economy into consideration. The Riksbank routinely takes into consideration changes in asset prices and 
other variables […].”14
As it was outlined by Svensson [2003], instrument rules like the Taylor [1993] rule are not 
appropriate to describe monetary policy for three main reasons: first, they are overly simple 
and mechanic, and therefore deny the necessary flexibility; second, they do not consider the 
fact  that  in  reality,  when setting  the  interest  rate,  central  banks  make  use  of  a  lot  more 
information  than  just  the  inflation  rate  and  the  output  gap;  finally,  the  parameters  of 
instrument rules estimated using for example the approach in Clarida et al. [1998] are not 
structural, in the sense that they are convolutions of structural and preference parameters, and 
estimation of a simple instrument rule would leave such parameters unidentified (see Favero 
and Rovelli [2003]).
For the reasons outlined so far, in order to compare the policy rules coming from alternative 
monetary policy frameworks,  we will  proceed to derive optimal monetary policy reaction 
13 The inflation target was formulated in January 1993, when the transition to the new monetary regime – after 
the collapse of  ERM – began.  However,  it  formally began to  apply in January 1995 (see Giavazzi  and 
Mishkin [2007]).
14 Sveriges Riksbank, “Monetary Policy in Sweden 2008”, p. 5
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functions using the approach introduced by Svensson [1997, 1999, 2000 and 2003] and also 
applied in Favero and Rovelli [2003] and extend it to the open economy, with a focus on  fear 
of floating as an alternative to “honest” Inflation Targeting.
Svensson [1997] has shown how the optimal policy reaction function can be derived for both 
strict and flexible Inflation Targeting in a closed economy15. Let us consider a very simple 
(backward-looking)  model  for  a  closed  economy  which  is  described  by  the  following 
equations:
  t1=t y ytt1 (4.1)
  y t1=y y t−r it−t−r t1 (4.2)
equation (4.1) is an accelerationist Phillips curve, where the change in inflation is increasing 
in lagged output16. Equation (4.2) is an aggregate demand curve, where the output gap  y is 
increasing in last period's output gap, and decreasing in the (ex-post) real interest rate. ε and η 
are zero-mean i.i.d. shocks (which can be labelled respectively as a cost-push shock and a 
demand shock) that are not observable at the beginning of the period. Equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) are the same as in Svensson [1997] and [1999] , and are quite standard in the literature. 
These functions are in general derived from optimization of consumers and firms in New 
Keynesian macro models with imperfect competition and sticky prices17.
The policy interest rate affects output with a one-period lag, and inflation with a two-period 
lag; in fact:
  t1=t y y y t−1−r it−1−t−1−r tt1 (4.3)
Let us assume that the inflation target is π, and the objective of the central bank is to choose a 
sequence of policy rates i to minimize the loss function: 
  ∑
i=0
∞
i L ti∣t (4.4)
where L is the period loss and , under strict inflation targeting, it is given by:
  Lt=
1
2 [t−
2 ] (4.5)
in other words,  the central  bank chooses the policy interest  rate in order to minimize the 
expected deviation of inflation from target. Since inflation stabilization is the only goal of 
15 The rest of the section draws on Svensson [1997], § 2 and 6.
16 Svensson [1997] also includes a vector of exogenous variables, but we disregard that here for simplicity.
17 See, for example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1999].
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monetary policy in this context, and the policy rate influences inflation only with two lags, the 
objective function can be written as:
  min
it
21
2
[t2∣t−] (4.6)
The FOC is given by setting the derivative of (4.6) with respect to it equal to zero:
  ( )[ ] 0|22|2
2
=−−=
∂
∂
+
+ pipiβαδδ ttrx
t
tt
i
L
  pipi =+ tt |2 (4.7)
The policy rate has to be set so that the two-period-ahead inflation forecast is equal to the 
target. To find an explicit formula for the interest rate, rewrite (4.3) in t+2 and substitute the 
terms in t+1 with the respective equation (4.1) or (4.2):
  t2=t y ytt1 y y y t−r it−t−r t1t2
  =t2∣t=1 y rt y 1y y t− y r it y r r
from which we obtain an expression for the repo rate:
it=rt
1
 y r
t−
1y
r
y t (4.8)
This is very similar to the Taylor rule, except that the coefficients of the Taylor rule are here 
explicitated as convolutions of the structural parameters from the AD and Phillips curves. 
Moreover, we notice that even if the central bank is pursuing strict inflation targeting, the 
output gap will appear in the policy rule: not because it is one of the targets of monetary 
policy, but because it is a predictor of future inflation. 
Let us now move to the more complex case of flexible inflation targeting. In this case, the 
period loss function (4.5) becomes:
  Lt=
1
2 [t−
2 y t
2] (4.9)
where  λ  is the weight attached on output stabilization relative to inflation. For the sake of 
brevity, we only report the results shown in Svensson [1997], where the equations describing 
the economy are the same as (4.1), (4.2) and (4.9). The FOC is:
  t2∣t−=−

 y k
y t1∣t   
where k  is a function of  λ, δ and απ ; this FOC tells us that the inflation forecast should equal 
the inflation target only if the expected output gap is zero; expected inflation shall be higher 
than  the  target  if  output  is  expected  to  be  below the  natural  rate.  The  reaction  function 
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(Svensson [1997], p. 1133) is:
  ( ) ( ) ( ) tyy
y
r
t
yr
y
tt yk
k
k
k
ri 



+
+
+−
+
++= β
δ αλ
δ α
βpipiδ αλβ
δ α
pi 2
2
2
1
                    (4.10)
The adjustment to the inflation target will be gradual, and it will be slower the higher the 
weight on output stabilization. This is due to the fact that the more rapid the adjustment to the 
target, the higher the fluctuations in output this will cause and, as long as the central bank 
cares for output stabilization, it will avoid excessive interest rate variability.
5. Derivation of interest rate rules in an Open Economy
The objective of this section is to move from the closed to the open economy case and, within 
this framework, to show how the Central Bank's optimal reaction function changes when the 
policy objectives change, within different Monetary Policy frameworks.
More precisely, we want to find alternative interest rate rules that are suitable for estimation, 
in order to find which one characterizes best the behaviour of  the Sveriges Riksbank. The 
empirical literature has generally estimated monetary policy reaction functions (in the form of 
forward-looking Taylor [1993] rules) using a GMM approach18 (see, for example, Clarida et 
al. [1998] and [2000]); however, as it was pointed out in Favero and Rovelli [2003], since 
Euler equations are the natural object of the GMM approach, it would be more natural to use 
first order conditions, derived from the Central Bank's optimization, to estimate the policy 
rule. 
The  model  outlined  in  Section  4,  when  we  consider  a  small  open  economy,  becomes 
somehow more complex: we need to augment the aggregate supply and demand relations to 
take care of the effect of the external sector. Let us assume that the aggregate demand in a 
small open economy is given by:
  y t1=y y t−r it−t−r q q tt1  (5.1)
where  q is the deviation of the real exchange rate, defined as domestic output per unit of 
foreign output, from PPP, so that when q= 0 the PPP holds and when q increases we have a 
real  depreciation;  therefore,  the coefficient  βq is  positive.  For  simplicity,  unlike  Svensson 
18 To be precise, the GMM approach is used when official forecasts for the inflation rate are not available, and 
therefore least squares estimation of a forward-looking Taylor Rule setting E t πt+k =  πt+k would result in an 
endogenous error term. When the Central Bank's inflation forecasts are available, however, (nonlinear) least 
squares are suited for the estimation of a forward-looking Taylor Rule with interest  rate smoothing (see 
Castelnuovo [2007] and De Aurelio [2005]).
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[2000], we have assumed that the foreign output gap does not influence the domestic business 
cycle.  Finally, νt+1 is a zero-mean i.i.d. demand shock.
The Phillips curve is given by:
  t1=t y ytq q tt1 (5.2)
where  αq> 0; a depreciation of the exchange rate has both a direct inflationary effect, since 
imported goods become more expensive, and an indirect effect through resource utilization 
which kicks with a two-period lag. Ξt+1 is a zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock, similar to ε 
defined in (4.1).
Since we are dealing with an open economy, with respect to the previous section we have to 
define an equilibrium relation for the exchange rate. For a small open economy, with free 
capital  mobility,  uncovered  interest  parity  should  hold.  We  can  write  it  for  the  nominal 
exchange rate as:
  e t=it
f−ite t1∣tt 19 (5.3)
where φ is a stationary i.i.d. disturbance which we will label the risk premium. The exchange 
rate tends to be higher (i.e. weaker) when it is expected to increase in the next period and 
when  foreign  interest  rates  are  higher  than  domestic  interest  rates.  Notice  that  the  real 
exchange rate is defined as:
  Qt=e tp t
f− pt  
When the PPP holds, Qt = 1, and thus the deviation from PPP is qt = Qt – 1. Plugging this in 
the UIP (5.3) above, we can rewrite it as:
  q t=qt1∣t−i ti t
f−t
ft−t (5.4)
which is the real interest parity, expressed in deviation from PPP.
Finally, we make an assumption on the evolution of the real exchange rate. When PPP holds, 
Qt is stationary and therefore shocks to this variable do not have permanent effects. More 
generally, we can assume that qt gradually adjusts to the PPP, i.e. it gradually goes to zero, 
according to the following rule:
  q t=− q t−1t
19 Notice that here we do not model the dynamics of foreign country variables, i.e. we do not specify a rule for 
the foreign interest rate. This, for example, implies that we disregard the impact of foreign monetary policy 
on foreign inflation. This choice is due to the need of keeping things simple so that we can analytically find 
the interest rate reaction functions, but the drawback is that it rules out one channel for the transmission of 
international shocks. This is evident in the Central Bank of Denmark's statement of Monetary Policy:  “The 
main objective of the monetary policy in the euro area is to maintain price stability, i.e. to avoid inflation. By 
keeping the krone stable vis-à-vis  the euro,  a  basis  for  low inflation is  also created  in  Denmark.” (see 
Danmarks Nationalbank's Introduction to Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy ).
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or, equivalently,
  q t=1− q t−1t (5.5)
which is a simple error correction mechanism suggesting that, ceteris paribus, in each period 
Qt converges to PPP (i.e. to its long-run constant value of 1) by γ, where  0 < γ < 1 is called 
the adjustment coefficient. ωt is a zero-mean i.i.d. disturbance, representing temporary shocks 
affecting the exchange rate that disturb its convergence to the long-run equilibrium.
The targeting rules analysis will be applied to four alternative scenarios: (i) exchange rate 
targeting;  (ii)  strict  inflation  targeting,  (iii)  flexible  inflation  targeting  and  (iv)  “fear  of 
floating”, that in this case describes a country that is pursuing inflation targeting with some 
weight  on  exchange  rate  stabilization  (here  we  do  not  care  whether  such  exchange  rate 
smoothing happens only de facto or also in official terms).
5.1. Exchange Rate Targeting
The simplest  case is  that  of pure exchange rate  targeting.  We can describe exchange rate 
targeting in our framework as the central bank choosing the interest rate path that minimizes 
the loss function: 
  min
it
E t∑
=0
∞
 Lt
where L is the period loss function, which in this case is:
  Lt=
1
2  et−e 
2
(5.6)
subject to (5.4): we assume that the central bank manages to keep the exchange rate at the 
announced target and, at the same time, imposes no capital controls20 and therefore the UIP 
holds, up to a stationary risk premium. We can show that the monetary policy strategy is very 
straightforward  and  intuitive  in  this  case.  Since  exchange  rate  stabilization  is  the  only 
objective of monetary policy, and the central bank influences the exchange rate immediately 
by changing the interest rate, while current policy decisions do not affect future values of the 
exchange rate (because et+1 | t is equal to the exchange rate target) , the first order condition is:
  ( ) eeeei
L
tt
t
t
=⇒=−−=
∂
∂          0
i.e. in each period, the interest rate has to be set so that the exchange rate stays at the official 
20 This is the framework that characterizes, for example, ERM II in Europe.
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target. Therefore, since the exchange rate is fixed, the expected rate of depreciation is zero 
and, from  (5.1), the policy rule is simply:
  it=it
ft
i.e. the domestic repo rate has to be always equal to the foreign rate (plus the risk premium). 
This  kind  of  rule  currently  characterizes,  for  example,  the  monetary policy of  Danmarks 
Nationalbank:
“The monetary policy is designed to keep the krone stable vis-à-vis the euro, and other aspects than the exchange 
rate […] are not considered in relation to monetary policy.[...] Danmarks Nationalbank can influence the krone 
rate by changing its monetary policy interest rates. When the exchange-rate market is stable, DNB normally 
changes its interest rates in step with the changes of the European Central Bank's minimum bid rate […]. In  a 
situation with upward or downward pressure on the krone or a sustained inflow or outflow of foreign currency, 
DNB indipendently changes its interest rates in order to stabilize the krone.” 21
5.2 Strict inflation targeting
When the Central Bank pursues  strict  inflation targeting, its objective is to reach the target 
within a pre-specified period, generally 1-2 years. Assume that  t in our model is equal to 3 
quarters as in Svensson [2000]. We know from equations (5.1)-(5.4) that, when it changes the 
interest rate at time t, the Central Bank immediately affects q; in t+1 it affects the output gap 
via the direct interest rate channel and the real exchange rate channel, and inflation via the 
exchange rate pass through (measured by  αq ). In  t+2, the interest rate intervention affects 
inflation via the output gap. When the central bank is pursuing strict inflation targeting, we 
can write the objective function as:
  min
it
∑
j=0
∞
 j 1
2 t j∣t− 
2
(5.7)
In order to keep things simple and obtain an analytical solution for all alternative regimes, we 
will  assume,  as  in  Svennson  [1999],  that  the  Central  Bank  adopts  a  period-by-period 
optimization: the monetary authority takes last year's policy decision as given, but disregards 
the  fact  that  today's  instrument  setting  will  affect  next  year's  loss  function.  While  this 
simplification is not free from drawbacks, it allows us to understand how alternative objective 
functions translate into different interest rate rules22. 
21 Danmarks Nationalbank (2003), Monetary Policy in Denmark, p. 22-24.
22 The approach of “period-by-period optimization” is drawn from Svensson [1999] who applies it to interest 
rate smoothing. When the lagged interest rate enters the loss function, as he argues,  the standard linear-
quadratic optimal control problem requires a numerical solution since the number of state variables goes up 
to three; for the same reason, we will use this approach also for the anaysis of the other regimes.
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Moreover, if we want to describe the behaviour of a real IT central bank such as the Swedish 
Riksbank, this  hypothesis  is not overly restrictive:  it  is  compatible,  for example,  with the 
Swedish Riksbank's policy statement that monetary policy is “normally focused on achieving 
the inflation target within two years”.
In sum, in this case the objective function simplifies to:
  min
it
2 1
2 t2∣t− 
2
Since the target has to be reached within 2 years, and the Central Bank influences inflation via 
the repo rate, today's setting of the interest rate is such that, given the Central Bank's models 
to forecast the inflation rate, constant-interest-rate two-years-ahead expected inflation is equal 
to the target, i.e. t2∣t= . The FOC with respect to it is simply: 
  ∂L
∂ it
=t2∣t−
∂t2∣t
∂ i t
=0
  t2∣t−−q1−−x q−x r=0
which becomes:
  t2∣t= (5.8)
Rewrite the AS curve in t+2 and after substituting we have:
  t2∣t=t y 1y  y tq y q qt− y r it−t−r q qt1∣t (5.9)
Consider again equation (5.9) and plug (5.5) in it:
  t2∣t=t y 1y  y tq y q qt− y r it−t−r q 1− q t
Merging this with FOC (5.8) and rearranging, we obtain the interest rate rule when the central 
bank pursues strict inflation targeting:
  it=tr
1
 y r
t−
1y
r
y t
q 2− yq
 y r
q t
The peculiarity of this interest rate rule is that, due to the real interest parity (5.4),  qt will 
automatically  respond  to  interest  rate  movements;  in  order  to  avoid  the  problem  of 
endogeneity of qt due to its contemporaneity with it, we substitute qt with (5.5)23:
  it=tr
1
 y r
t−
1y
r
y t
q 2− y q
 y r
1−q t−1 (5.10)
Equation (5.10) is the policy rule in strict IT: the  interest rate is raised when inflation is above 
23 This is equivalent to saying that the central bank responds with a lag to shocks to the exchange rate, and 
knowing the adjustment mechanism of the real exchange rate it assumes that, over the current period, the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from PPP will be (1 – γ) times that of the previous period. 
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target but, although the actual monetary policy strategy is strict inflation targeting, the policy 
rate  is  also influenced by the output  gap and the real  exchange rate  deviation from PPP. 
Therefore, when the real exchange rate is weak, the central bank increases the repo rate to 
cool down the inflationary pressure and bring qt back to its long-run equilibrium faster than it 
would otherwise go.
We can therefore see that an interest rate rule for inflation targeting in an open economy has 
the output gap and the real  exchange rate  in it  even if  the central  bank is  pursuing strict 
inflation targeting.  The reason is that both  qt and  yt are predictors of future inflation,  and 
therefore their role in the monetary policy rule is “indirect”.
The coefficient  of  the  real  exchange rate  in  the interest  rate  rule  is  higher  the lower the 
adjustment factor  γ, suggesting that when real exchange rate shocks are persistent the policy 
rate will exhibit higher variability. Interest rate rule (5.10) encompasses two extreme cases, 
that is when shocks to qt are not absorbed and there is no adjustment to the PPP (i.e. γ=0  and 
qt+1|t = qt) and when shocks are immediately absorbed (i.e. γ=1  and qt+1|t = 1).
In the former case, equation (5.10) becomes:
  it=rt
1
 y r
t−
1y
 r
y t
2q yq
 y r
qt          (5.11)
while, when convergence to PPP occurs within one period, equation (8) becomes:
  it=rt
1
 y r
t−
1y
 r
y t                 (5.12)
The difference with respect to (5.11) is that the policy rate is not sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations; this result is intuitive: if qt rapidly goes back to equilibrium, shocks to it will 
have no effect on future inflation. 
Within the simple case of strict IT it is easy to consider the effect of the time horizion of the 
monetary authority on the interest rate rule. In particular, we ask to ourselves: what happens if 
the target horizon of the central bank is longer? In this case, the more persistent real exchange 
rate fluctuations, the higher will be the weight of this variable in the interest rate rule.
Let us assume that the Central Bank wants to reach the target in three periods. The objective 
function becomes:
  min
it
3 1
2 t3∣t− 
2
          (5.13)
and therefore the FOC is the same as in the previous case, moved one period further ahead:
19
  ∂L
∂ it
=t3−
∂t3
∂ it
=0
which is simply: πt+3|t = π. Three-periods-ahead expected inflation is:
  t3∣t=t2∣t y yt2∣tq q t2∣t  
If we assume that the RER adjusts to the PPP according to (5.5) and that forecasts of inflation 
and output gap are made at a constant interest rate 24, after some algebra we obtain the interest 
rate reaction function, which we write as:
  it=rt
1
 x r2x 
t−
11x xx r
r2x 
x t
a 1−
 x r2x 
q t−1           (5.14)
where a=q x r3−1−2 x q2−x  . Notice that, with respect to equation 
(5.10), the coefficient on current inflation is lower, the coefficient on the output gap is lower 
and the coefficient on qt is higher. The results stemming from this section are summarized in 
Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1.
In an open economy,  the interest  rate rule of  a Central  Bank pursuing strict  Inflation 
Targeting will have a role for  yt and qt, other than for (  πt – π ). Other things equal, the 
interest rate reactivity to real exchange rate shocks will be larger when the target horizon 
is longer, when shocks to qt are more persistent (i.e. γ → 0) and when the exchange rate 
pass-through (captured by αq ) is larger.
5.3. Flexible inflation targeting
With respect to the closed economy case, we assume a more general framework for flexible 
IT: the flexibility comes both from a positive weight on output stabilization and a weight put 
on interest rate stabilization and smoothing25, similar to Svensson [1999]:
  min
it
∑
j=0
∞
 j 1
2 [t j∣t− 
2ii t−i t−1
2ri t−t−r 
2 y yt j∣t
2 ]          (5.15)
subject to (5.1), (5.2), (5.4), where the weight on inflation is normalized to 1 and  λi, λr, λy ≥ 0 
are respectively the relative weight put on interest rate smoothing (i.e. the central bank wants 
to avoid excessive interest rate variability), on interest rate stabilization around the target real 
rate, and on output stabilization.
Assuming a period-by-period optimization as in the previous case, the problem to be solved 
by the Central Bank becomes:
24 Most IT Central Banks which target expected inflation develop inflation forecasts under the assumption of 
constant interest rates.
25 In Section 7, when we take these interest rate rules to the data, we will also consider these cases separately.
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  min
it
1
2
2 [t2∣t− 2i it−i t−12r it−t−r 2y yt1∣t2 ]           (5.16)
and thus the monetary authority takes last year's policy decision as given, but disregards the 
fact that today's instrument setting will affect next year's loss function. When λi = λr = λy = 0, 
this problem is equivalent to the intertemporal problem analysed for the case of strict inflation 
targeting. 
Notice that in objective function (5.16) the central bank sets the interest rate to minimize the 
two-period-ahead inflation gap and the one-period-ahead output gap. In principle, there is no 
fundamental  reason why the time horizon for the output gap and inflation gap objectives 
should  be the  same;  in  (5.16)  the difference  is  due to  the  fact  that,  given the  dynamical 
structure of our simple model, the central bank can affect output via the policy rate after one 
period, while it takes two periods for inflation to be influenced by monetary policy. In any 
case, even if the output gap appeared in t+2, the results would qualitatively be the same.
Minimizing (5.16) with respect to it yields the following FOC:
 −t2∣t−q 2− y rq−y rq y t1∣tiit−it−1r it−t−r =0          
          (5.17) 
This is the targeting rule of the central bank, showing that when the policy rule is flexible 
inflation targeting, with respect to strict IT, the adjustment towards the target will be slower 
due to interest rate smoothing. After some algebra, the interest rate rule is:
  
it=
i
irb2r
it−1
b2rrb1 y r
irb2r
tr 
b1
 irb2r
t−

b1 y 1 yb2y 
irb2r
yt
b2qb1q2− yq1−
irb2r
q t−1
          (5.18)
where b1=q2− y  rq and b2=y rq .
Two things are worth noticing. First of all, as in the strict IT case, although the monetary 
authority does not have a target for the real exchange rate, it will respond to its fluctuations 
since it affects expected inflation and the expected output gap. The second result which is 
worth  noticing  is  that  the  coefficients  of  the  “Taylor  Rule”  (5.18)  are  convolutions  of 
structural parameters and the preference parameters  λi, λr,  λy.. When  λi and  λr are different 
from zero, interest rate variability is lower with respect to the case of strict IT.
Finally,  when  λy >  0,  the  monetary authority's  reaction  to  output  and  real  exchange  rate 
fluctuations  will  be  larger,  and  that  to  inflation  smaller,  than  in  strict  IT.  The  results  on 
flexible inflation targeting are summarized in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2.
The interest rate rule of a Central Bank pursuing flexible Inflation Targeting will have 
coefficients on (πt - π) , yt and qt that are convolutions of structural parameters and the 
preference parameters λx  = [λy , λi , λr] .  If λx = 0 we go back to the strict IT case. Other 
things equal, the larger any element in λx , the lower the response to inflation fluctuations, 
and the larger the response to fluctuations in yt and qt . As in strict IT, other things equal, 
the interest rate reactivity to shocks to qt will be larger when γ → 0.
5.4. Fear of Floating
Let us now move to the case of “Fear of Floating” or exchange rate smoothing. In order to 
concentrate on the role of the exchange rate, we will assume here that the weight on interest 
rate smoothing and output stabilization is zero, i.e. λi  = λr = λy = 0. The loss function becomes:
  L t , e t−et−1 =
1
2 [t−
2e e t−e t−1 
2]
and thus we allow for a weight  λe ≥ 0 for exchange rate smoothing, that is, for a separate 
exchange rate objective in the monetary policy. In order to keep things simple, as it was stated 
above (see  fn.  14)  we will  assume here that  the  Central  Bank adopts  a  period-by-period 
optimization as we did above. This, other than being an acceptable restriction as we explained 
in section 5.3, will simplify matters and we will not have to resort to a numerical solution, 
while still being able to understand the consequences of fear of floating on the interest rate 
rule. 
The objective function of the Central Bank therefore becomes:
  min
it
1
2 [
2 t2∣t− 2e e t−et−12]           (5.19)
subject to
  t2=t1 y yt1q q t1t2   
Recall that expected two-period-ahead inflation was written in (5.9) as:
  t2∣t=t y 1y  y tq2− y q qt− y r i t−t−r 
The FOC for minimizing (18) with respect to the repo rate is:
  t2∣t=−
e
2  yqq2− y r 
 et−e t−1            (5.20)
We can compare (5.20) with the FOC in the strict IT case: with fear of floating, expected 
inflation two periods ahead is equal to the target only if the exchange rate is stable. If the 
exchange rate in the current period is weak compared to the previous period, i.e. e t > et-1 , then 
the interest rate is kept at a level higher than what would ensure that the inflation target is 
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reached in t+2, and therefore πt+2 < π.  The opposite holds when the exchange rate is falling. 
The deviation from the target will be higher the larger is γ, that is, the faster the real exchange 
rate tends to converge to PPP. In other words, when PPP holds it is harder to control the 
exchange rate  via interest  rate intervention and thus more costly in  terms of deviation of 
inflation from the Central Bank's target.
Plug this FOC in (5.9) and we get:
  t y1 y  y t q2− y q qt− y ri t−t−r =−
e
c1
et−e t−1
where c1=
2  y qq 2− y r  .
We can therefore derive the interest rate rule in fear of floating as:
  it=tr
1
 y r
t−
1y 
r
y t
q2− yq
 y r
q t
e
c1 yr
e t−e t−1           (5.21)
using the definition of real exchange rate in (5.21), we can rewrite it as:
  it=tr
1
 y r
t−
1y
r
y t
c2
 y r
t−t
f 
c3
 y r
qt−1          (5.22)
where the ci coefficients are defined as:
c2=
e
c1
; c3= q2− y q 1−
e
c1
.
Apart from the analytical complexity of the coefficients, we can see from (5.22) that, with 
fear of floating, the interest rate response to shocks to inflation and the real exchange rate will 
be stronger than in strict and flexible inflation targeting, since b1 is positive. Moreover, as in 
the previous case, the lower the adjustment coefficient γ, the stronger its role in the interest 
rate rule. The results of the case of Fear of Floating are summarized in Proposition 3 below. 
Proposition 3.
The interest rate rule of a Central Bank with fear of floating and zero weight on output 
stabilization will feature larger reaction coefficients for shocks to πt and qt with respect to 
strict and flexible IT. Such coefficients are convolutions of structural parameters and the 
preference parameter λe. The interest rate response to exchange rate fluctuations will be 
larger when γ →0. All other conclusions drawn in Proposition 1 are confirmed.
The results obtained in sections 5.1 – 5.4 are summarized in Table 5.1, which classifies the 
policy rules according to the interest rate reactivity to shocks of different nature26. 
26 This table is an attempt to “bridge the gap” between the literature on inflation targeting and exchange rate 
regime classification, and is similar to Table 1 in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2005]; the difference is that 
our results were derived from an optimization process of the central bank, while in their case they are  a 
priori definitions.
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Table 5.1. Interest rate reactions to different shocks
π x q if
Exchange Rate Targeting Nil Nil High High
Strict Inflation Targeting Medium Low Low Low
Flexible Inflation Targeting Low Medium Medium Low
Fear of Floating High Medium High High
The definitions “low”, “medium” and “high” should be interpreted as relative with respect to 
the other three regimes included in the analysis; in order to say anything on the magnitude of 
the coefficients, we need parameter values from the structural model.
6. A stylized model of the Swedish economy
The first step in the empirical analysis is the estimation of a small model for the Swedish 
economy. This will allow us to obtain the empirical counterparts of the theoretical model  in 
Section 5.
Depending on the chosen specification27, the literature seems to have reached a consensus on 
the  minimal  set  of  variables  that  should  be  present  in  an  empirical  model  aimed  at 
representing aggregate demand and supply in a small open economy; this includes domestic 
and foreign output (gap), price level (or inflation), short-term interest rates, the (nominal or 
real) exchange rate and possibly some commodity price index28.
In our case, the “rest of the world” is proxied by the euro area, and the exchange rate is 
therefore the bilateral rate. This assumption is not overly restrictive; almost 60% of Swedish 
international trade is with the euro area, and a similar assumption is quite common in the 
literature on small open economies29.
As far as the sample period is concerned, we only consider data from the inflation targeting 
era, i.e. from 1995 on. This will help us to avoid the risk of including different regimes while 
maintaining a sufficient number of observations: in fact, Sweden was a member of the ERM 
from 1986 to 1992, then abandoned it because of speculative attacks to the Krona. Between 
27 i.e., whether the one at hand is a model with stationary or cointegrated variables.
28 See, for example,  Eichembaum and Evans [1995],  Jacobson et  al.  [2001]; Kim and Roubini [1997] also 
include a commodity price index, while Betts et al. [1996] augment the system with a (domestic and foreign) 
monetary aggregate.
29 Betts et al. [1996], for example, in a Cointegration analysis for Canada, use the U.S. as a proxy for the rest of 
the world. 
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1992:4 and 1994:4, Sweden suffered from a severe economic downturn and financial crisis, 
while on the other hand, the inflation targeting regime, coupled with a flexible exchange rate, 
was being put in place. Inflation targeting was not, however, adopted officially until January 
1995; moreover, Sweden entered the European Union in the same month and, although its 
economy was already well integrated with the rest of Europe, it is plausible that this fostered 
further economic integration. For this reason, we will restrict ourselves to the period from 
1995 to 2008. 
There are several alternative empirical strategies to identify a set of equations that could be 
interpreted as a small structural model for the Swedish economy. Two alternative approaches 
are VAR (Vector Autoregressive) models and structural econometric models. VAR models are 
the most general, a-theoretical models to describe the macroeconomy. Once the choice on the 
set of variables  and the number of lags (on the basis of information criteria and likelihood 
ratio tests) is made, the researcher “lets the data speak” and, given an empirically congruent 
representation of the DGP, imposes restrictions to identify long-run (in Cointegrated VARs - 
CVARs) relations among the variables or structural shocks (in Structural VARs - SVARs). The 
main drawback of VARs, however, is that they are very demanding in terms of data needed. 
As the number of variables and lags increases, the number of parameters increases quickly, 
raising the so-called problem of “vanishing degrees of freedom” of VARs, not to mention the 
fact that, in the case of CVARs, tables for the rank test have been developed only for models 
with up to 11 variables30. 
On the other hand, structural econometric models are identified by imposing restrictions on 
the parameters of the models; they are more parsimonious than VARs and therefore more 
reliable when the number of observations is limited; finally, all restrictions imposed on the 
system are testable, while the same is not true for SVARs, identified using recursive and/or 
sign restictions. For these reasons, we will stick to structural econometric models.  Since we 
do not know what the “true” data generating process (DGP) is, we will start from specifying a 
statistical model which should be general enough to deliver a congruent representation of the 
true DGP. In other words, in the first stage we will estimate regression equations similar to 
(5.1) – (5.4) specified as general polynomial lags models31:
30 For a discussion, see Johnston, DiNardo [1997], Chp. 9.
31 The empirical model here is similar to Golinelli and Rovelli [2005], although unlike them we do not include 
a Taylor Rule, since it will be estimated separately in the next section.
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  y t=d 0d 1L y t−1−d 2 Li t−1−t−1d 3 Lq t−1d 4Lwtt
y (6.1)
  t= f 0 f 1 Lt−1 f 2 L y t−1 f 3 Lt−1
f  f 4 Lq t−1 f 5L4 C tt
 (6.2)
  q t=g0g 1Lq t−1t
q (6.3)
Equations  (6.1)  –  (6.3)  represent  our  empirical  model;  the  identification  assumptions 
embodied  in  this  model  are  quite  standard  in  the  literature  and  resemble  the  (simpler) 
theoretical  model  in  section  5:  first,  Monetary  Policy  cannot  affect  output  and  prices 
immediately; the setting of interest rates affects the real exchange rate immediately and output 
with some lag; this will, in turn, affect inflation. Second, the foreign (i.e. “large”) economy 
variables and commodity inflation are exogenous; thus, shocks originating in the domestic 
economy (Sweden) have no impact on Europe and on commodity prices. Equation 6.1 is an 
Aggregate Demand equation normalized on the domestic output gap; output depends on its 
past values, on the real interest rate, the growth in world demand (proxied by euro area output 
growth,  Δw32)  and  the  real  exchange  rate.  The  presence  of  the  contemporaneous  foreign 
growth rate allows for synchronized shocks to output. Equation (6.2) is an aggregate supply 
equation, where inflation is determined by past inflation, imported inflation (i.e. the euro area 
inflation rate), resource utilization (the past output gap), convergence to the purchasing power 
parity and commodity price inflation, Δ4Ct  .  Equation (6.3) is just a more general representa-
tion of (5.5)33 and shows how the real exchange rate corrects to the PPP; when Σg1l < 1 the real 
exchange rate is stationary. 
We will further test the validity of the real interest parity, that was included in the theoretical 
model of section 5. The RIP shows how q is immediately affected by monetary policy shocks 
(i.e. changes in the interest rate). 
The  first  step  will  be  to  estimate  the  model  equation  by  equation,  in  order  to  impose 
restrictions on the dynamics of each regression. Equations (6.1) to (6.3) are thus estimated by 
OLS34.  Once each equation is estimated and passes all specification tests, we simplify the 
dynamic structure by dropping the parameters which are not significant at 5%, following a 
limited  information  approach and making sure  that  the  parsimonious  model  residuals  are 
32 The analysis was however robust to a different definition of  w, i.e. a weighted average of Sweden's main 
trade partners (EMU, USA, Norway, UK and Denmark).
33 According to (5.5), qt = (1 – γ ) qt-1 + ωt
34 An alternative specification of the AD curve shows the output gap responding to the  expected real interest 
rate.  In  this case,  the equation should be estimated by 2SLS.  We have performed this exercise and the 
estimates are very close to OLS estimates with the realized interest rate. However, there might be a problem 
of weak instruments. 
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white  noise.  Finally,  we  re-estimate  the  simultaneous  equations  model,  with  further 
restrictions, by Constrained Full Information Maximum Likelihood (CFIML).  
Inflation is measured as the annual change in the CPI35; the real exchange rate is defined as: qt 
= et + pt* - pt where  p is the (log) swedish price level and  p* is the european CPI;  e  is the 
nominal bilateral SEK/Euro exchange rate; commodity prices are measured using the IMF 
index for all commodities; finally, the output gap is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 
8436. Data are seasonally and working day adjusted.
As a  starting point,  we chose L=3 lags  for  each equation (6.1)  –  (6.3).  Table  6.1  shows 
specification tests for the three equations; notice that the restricted regression equations are 
well specified as the residuals are white noise. Moreover, even when the variables included in 
the system are nonstationary, regression is valid as long as the regressors are cointegrated (see 
Hsiao [1997]).   
Nonstationarity of interest rates and inflation is an issue in the present dataset; the fact that 
these variables have a unit root might be disturbing from a theoretical point of view but it has 
been widely discussed in the empirical literature37. 
The AD curve shows that the real  interest  rate affects  output with three lags;  output also 
responds to real exchange rate changes and foreign output growth (robust standard errors in 
parenthesis):
  y t=−0.002
0.001
0.803
0.044
y t−1−0.079
0.031
it−3−t−30.043
0.019
qt−2−qt−30.215
0.037
w tt
y
(6.6)
The negative (and significant) constant is  in line with Hjelm and Jönsson [2010] who state 
that an estimation of the Swedish output gap starting in the beginning of the 1990s necessarily 
yields  an  output  gap  which  is  negative on average due to the consequences of the financial 
crisis of the '90s.
35 There is some debate on whether it is more appropriate to use the annual rate or the annualized quarterly 
inflation. Lindé [2003], on Sweden, discusses how this may be not relevant for a large economy, but it is for 
small  open  economies  such  as  Sweden.  The  annualized  quarterly  rate  adds  variability  that  cannot  be 
explained by the model nor additional variables. Moreover, the Riksbank defines inflation in its policy rule as 
the annual change in the CPI.
36 The OECD measures the output gap using the production function approach. The estimation was robust to 
the use of a different measure of output gap (obtained using the HP filter), although the coefficient on y was 
larger.  
37 The argument that inflation is I(1) and therefore prices are I(2), which leads to the empirical finding of the 
failure of the PPP and the UIP to hold, has been thoroughly investigated and discussed by Juselius [2006] and 
Johansen et a. [2009], just to name a couple (see also fn. 45).
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Table 6.1. Specification Tests 38
εY επ εq
Normality 0.783 0.589 0.320
Autocorrelation Ljung_Box (4) 0.504 0.111 0.246
ARCH LM(4) 0.995 0.501 0.330
R2
Output Gap
0.939
Inflation
0.848
Real Exch. Rate
0.999
Moreover, the same authors state that when prices, as well as wages, react more to positive 
gaps than to negative gaps, as it is the case for Sweden39, the output gap will be negative on 
average.
The  Aggregate  Supply  curve  shows  that  the  inflation  rate  is  positively  affected  by  past 
inflation, the output gap two periods before, commodity price inflation and the real exchange 
rate:
  t=t−10.112
0.047
yt−20.085
0.020
qt−1−q t−30.018
0.006
4C t−4C t−1t

(6.7)
The  coefficient  on  inflation  was  restricted  to  1,  and  this  restriction,  together  with  the 
restrictions on the coefficients on q and ΔC could not be rejected with a p-value of 0.104. The 
restriction on past inflation is also present in theoretical macro models that have been cited in 
the present work such as Svensson [1997]. This is equivalent to finding that expectations are 
backward-looking and therefore, in the Phillips Curve, πet = πt-140; thus we can re-write (6.7) 
as:
  t=0.112
0.047
y t−20.085
0.020
qt−1−q t−30.018
0.006
4C t−4C t−1t

Finally, the real exchange rate is represented here as an AR(1) process: if the real exchange 
rate is stationary, as it should occur if purchasing power parity holds, then it should be mean-
reverting and its coefficient significantly lower than one. In our case, we have:
  q t=1.00
na
qt−1t
q
 (6.8)
The real exchange rate was found to be nonstationary, i.e. purchasing power parity does not 
hold The restriction that g1 = 1 could not be rejected with a p-value of 0.510.
38 Other single-equation tests were performed which are not reported here and show that the model is well-
specified and no parameter instability seems to be present.
39 See also Eliasson [2001].
40 See Bagliano et al. [2001], Taylor [1999] and Rudebusch and Svensson [1999].
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Table 6.2. Real Interest Parity
qt=qt1∣t−itit
f−t
ftt where t=0.003
0.004 
0.645
0.133
t−1 t

ADF test on φ with a constant and no trend τ = -2.008 ; p-value 0.040 
While this might sound puzzling from a theoretical point of view, the fact that the PPP does 
not  hold  (if  not  over  very  long time  horizons)  has  been  documented  in  many empirical 
papers41. In other words, since the coefficient on qt-1 is exactly equal to 1,  γ = 0 in (5.5) and 
the real exchange rate exhibits a unit root. We have also checked for possible level shifts at 
significant dates which might  have determined the nonstationarity of  qt  but no significant 
break was found. Apparently, qt has been steadily depreciating over the sample period, since 
Sweden had a lower average inflation rate than the Euro Area, with the nominal exchange rate 
not correcting for the imbalance.  The overidentified structure of the system could not be 
rejected, with a p-value of 0.06542. Table 6.2 shows the real interest parity equation, which 
was estimated by 2SLS, and the risk premium. As it is clear from the table, the risk premium 
is stationary, with a positive but insignificant contant term.
Summing up, monetary policy affects inflation indirectly, through different channels: the real 
exchange rate channel, with a lag of 1 quarter, and the interest rate channel via the output gap, 
after 5 quarters, i.e. 1 year and three months.
7. The Identification of Central Bank Preferences
We can identify Central Bank preferences by assigning the Central Bank a loss function to be 
minimized, as we did in the theoretical model of Section 5, subject to the constraint given by 
the structure of the economy that was estimated in Section 6. Once the relevant first order 
conditions have been derived, we will estimate them and compare the results we obtain under 
alternative policy regimes like those we outlined in Section 5 with the actual policy adopted 
by  the  Riksbank.  The  general  problem is  the  following.  The  Central  bank  chooses  it to 
minimize the loss function:
41 See  for  example  Juselius  and  McDonald  [2004  and  2007]  and  Juselius  [2006]  who  have  thoroughly 
investigated the so-called PPP puzzle, and this results seem to support the so-called Imperfect Knowledge 
Economics theory by Frydman and Goldberg [2007] as opposed to the mainstream Rational Expectations 
theory.
42 The complete statistics as well as vector specification tests are available on request.
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  E t∑
k=0

k [ tk−2y ytk2 i i tk−i tk−1 2r  itk−tk−r2eetk−etk−12 ] (7.1)
where λx, x = [ π, y, i, r, e ]  are the weights attached to the various goals of monetary policy in 
the present setup; the terms  (it –  it-1) and (it –  πt –  r) are added to the theoretical setup of 
Section 5 to allow for the case of interest rate stabilization and smoothing43. 
The loss function is minimized with respect to it subject to the structure of the economy:
  tk=0tk−11 ytk−22 qtk−1−3 qtk−344 C tk−54 C tk−1tk
 (7.2)
  ytk=01 ytk−1−2 i tk−3−tk−33 q tk−2−q tk−34w t ktk
y (7.3)
  qtk=qtk1∣t−i tki tk
f −tk
f tk−tk (7.4)
  qtk1∣t=1−q tktk1
q (7.5)
The structure defined in equations (7.2) – (7.5) is derived from the empirical model estimated 
in Section 6; the estimated αi and βi coefficients are reported in table 7.1. Notice that, given 
the model in Section 6, real interest parity holds, up to a stationary risk premium;  qt is a 
random walk, since γ = 0. 
The  five  alternative  monetary  policy  strategies  are  defined  by  different  weights   λx as 
described in table 7.2: these are precisely the coefficients  we want to estimate within out 
framework. To this end, we also set a numerical value for the discount factor. In particular, we 
set δ = 0.984 which corresponds to a discount rate of around 1.6%; this figure is equal to the 
average real interest rate in Sweden over the period we are considering. The cited works of 
Favero and Rovelli  [2003] and Collins and Siklos [2004] adopted different approaches to 
defining δ. The former sets δ = 0.975, while the latter chooses, for each country, a level of δ 
consistent with the average interest rate over the sample period. We therefore follow Collins 
and Siklos; however, our results are robust to a (marginally) different choice of δ. 
As  in  Section  5,  rather  than  assuming  a  “timeless  perspective”  for  the  central  bank,  we 
consider  a  finite-time  horizon,  so  that  we  are  able  to  derive  analytically  the  first  order 
conditions for all regimes. As far as the length of the horizon k is concerned, that depends on 
the monetary policy regime. In the case of exchange rate targeting, we know from Section 5 
that it is optimal for the Central Bank to passively follow foreign monetary policy, so the 
horizon is one period.
43 See also Svensson [1997].
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Table 7.1. Estimated Structural Coefficients
α0 1.000 α4 0.018 β2 0.079
α1 0.112 α5 0.018 β3 0.043
α2 0.085 β0 -0.002 β4 0.215
α3 0.085 β1 0.803 γ 0
Table 7.2. Preference parameters and monetary policy regimes.
Regimes weights λπ44 λy λi λr λe
1. Exchange Rate Targeting 0 0 0 0 1
2. Strict Inflation Targeting 1 0 0 0 0
3. Interest Rate Smoothing 1 0 > 0 > 0 0
4. Flexible Inflation Targeting 1 > 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0
5. Fear of Floating 1 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0
Within strict inflation targeting, the Central Bank only has the concern of stabilizing inflation 
at its target; since, in the present case, we have seen that the interest rate channel kicks in after 
5 quarters, then k=5.
The remaining three regimes are extensions  of strict  inflation targeting where the Central 
Bank wants to minimize fluctuations in output, the interest rate and/or the exchange rate. Here 
we set  k=8 to be consistent with the monetary policy statement of the Riksbank45:
“(...) Monetary Policy is normally focused on achieving the inflation target within two years. One reason for that is 
that  the effects of monetary policy appear with a lag. Another reason is that  the Riksbank,  by aiming at this 
horizon, can contribute to dampening fluctuations in the real economy(...)”
It has been discussed [see Svensson, (1999)] that by smoothing the interest rate, the Central 
Bank might also stabilize output, as a side product. In other words, when forecasted inflation 
is above target,  rather than immediately setting  i  to the level that brings inflation back to 
target as soon as possible given policy lags, the Central Bank gradually changes the interest 
rate, and in this way it minimizes output fluctuations. For this reason, the time horizon in 
regimes 3 to 5 is equal to 8 quarters, consistent with the Riksbank's official statements.
With a horizon of 8 periods and the dynamics given in (7.2) – (7.4), the first order conditions 
for regimes 2 to 5 of Table 7.1 would be particularly complicated, with many collinear terms; 
44 Except for Exchange Rate Targeting, where λπ is set to zero, in all other alternative regimes we normalize it 
to 1, without loss of generality.
45 Monetary Policy in Sweden 2008, p. 13.
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this  collinearity  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  length  of  the  horizon46.  To  obtain  a 
manageable  solution  we  consider  for  those  regimes  a  period-by-period  optimization,  as 
discussed in Section 5. This, however, is not an overly strong simplifying assumption as it 
appears consistent with official  Central  Bank statements.  Moreover,  this  approach has the 
advantage, on the empirical side, that it allows us to estimate policy rules relying only on 
official forecasts of inflation,47. 
The availability of official forecasts is a serious advantage of the present analysis. Real-time 
forecasts are very attractive because they can be considered predetermined variables in period 
t, and consistent parameter estimates can be computed running least squares regression. In 
fact, since the actual forecast rather than a proxy is available, the former can be used as a 
regressor,  and  one  does  not  need  to  revert  to  instrumental  variable  estimation.  Empirical 
Taylor rules generally put a very high coefficient on monetary policy inertia48 and this appears 
to be due to a weak instrument problem (see Consolo and Favero [2009]). By using real-time 
forecasts we can circumvent this limitation of monetary policy rules estimation, and this is 
another strength of the present empirical analysis.
7.1 Exchange Rate Targeting
In the case of Exchange Rate Targeting, the policy rule to be estimated is:
  it=1it
f t (7.6)
where we should have κ1 = 1 and ψt should be stationary.  The results are presented in Table 
7.2. The restriction to 1 is rejected at all significance levels, and residuals are nonstationary; 
thus, while the two interest rates have been moving closely, a “strict exchange rate targeting” 
policy cannot well mirror swedish monetary policy in the last 14 years. This is not a surprise: 
while  there  is  a  doubt  that  the  Riksbank  might  have  put  some weight  on  exchange  rate 
stabilization, it is clear from both official statements and its actions that in several occasions it 
actually pursued an interest rate policy that did not always follow that of the ECB.
46 See Favero and Rovelli [2003].
47 Over the whole sample, only forecasts at t, t+4 and t+8 are available. If we adopted a finite-time horizon, also 
πt+1|t, … , πt+7|t and  yt+1|t,..., yt+7|t would appear in the FOC and they would need to be instrumented.
48 One example is Clarida et al. [2002].
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Table 7.3. Euler Equation: Exchange Rate Targeting.
Estimated Equation is (7.6). Sample: 1995Q1 - 2008Q4
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-Value
κ1 1.262 0.071 17.70 0.000
Restrictions: κ1=1   F(1,55) = 13.506   p-value: 0.001
R-squared:0.851 S.E. Of Regression:0.0166 Mean of Dep. Var.: 0.0391
φ ADF (with constant): τ = -1.526 p-value: 0.119         
t=−0.001
0.001
0.941
0.036
t−1
Estimation method: OLS. Standard Errors are HAC.
 
7.2 Strict Inflation Targeting
As anticipated above, in order to have a manageable solution we will assume a period-by-
period optimization as discussed in Section 5.
We know from Section 6 that, in Sweden, it takes 5 quarters for monetary policy to affect the 
inflation rate via the interest rate channel. Minimizing equation (7.1) setting k=549  and λi, λy, 
λe and λr equal to zero we obtain the empirical counterpart of (5.10):
  it=
0
2
rt
1
12
t4∣t−
1
2
yt2∣t
4
2
wt5∣t           (7.7)
The corresponding unrestricted equation is:
  it=k 0k 1tk 2t4∣t−k 3 y t2∣tk 4w t5∣t           (7.8)
Notice from (7.7) that, due to the structure of the economy, the real exchange rate and the 
commodity price index are cancelled from the interest rate rule, since α2 = α3  and α4 = α5. In 
the  present  case,  with  strict  inflation  targeting,  when  the  central  bank  is  responding  to 
forecasted  inflation  and  output  gap,  the  coefficients  on  q and  commodity  price  inflation 
should thus be zero, as q and ΔC only have a role as predictors of future inflation. 
If the Riksbank has indeed been following strict inflation targeting, the actual and optimal 
interest rate reaction functions should not differ too much from each other; by imposing the 
appropriate restrictions we should therefore reconcile (7.7) with (7.8). That is, the following 
restrictions should not be rejected:
  
k 1=1 ; k 2=
1
12
; k3=
1
2
; k 4=
4
2
49 One might argue that it is a contradiction to set k = 5 in the Strict Inflation Targeting case while it is well  
known that the time horizon of the Riksbank is two years. However, the choice of k = 5 is consistent with the 
idea of the Central Bank only caring to bring inflation back to equilibrium. As Svensson [1997, p. 356] has 
pointed out, “(...) under strict IT the instrument should be adjusted such that the conditional inflation forecast 
for a horizon corresponding to the control lag always equals the inflation target”.
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Table  7.4,  column 3  reports  the  results  of  the  strict  IT case.  A Wald  Test  on  the  above 
restrictions rejected them at all  significance levels.  The estimated  interest  rate rule would 
imply a higher interest rate variability than what is observed in practice, but still it can capture 
the behaviour of the Swedish policy interest rates moderately well; a strict inflation targeting 
rule with optimal coefficients as derived from our structural model estimated in the previous 
section,  instead,  does  not  predict  correctly  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficients.  Indeed,  the 
optimal coefficients if the Riksbank had actually been pursuing strict IT would have been 
much larger, and the interest rate variability extremely high. This result is in line with those in 
Favero and Rovelli [2003] and Collins and Siklos [2004] and the prediction of the theoretical 
model by Svensson [2000].
7.3 Interest Rate Smoothing
In the case of interest rate stabilization and smoothing, we set λy and λe equal to zero in (7.1) 
and k = 8; minimizing the loss function with respect to it we obtain the following first order 
condition:
  8t8∣t−−2 2−12111
21
3ii t−it−1rit−t−r =0
For the purpose of estimation, we can rewrite it as:
  it=
r
ir
r
r
ir
t
i
ir
i t−1
8 k5
ir
t8∣t−           (7.9)
where k1 = 2α2 + α1 (β2 + β3 β1) (1 + β1 + β12 + β13). Two things are worth noticing: first, output 
does not appear in the first order condition, i.e. the central bank responds to output only as an 
indicator  of  forecasted  inflation.  In  other  words,  they  are  included  in  the  forecast  πt+8  |  t 
produced by the Central Bank. 
The problem with (7.9) is that the coefficients are not uniquely identified. In order to achieve 
identification, we have to impose further restrictions, either on the target real interest rate, that 
we have assumed to be constant50, or on k5. 
We choose the latter option, imposing the restriction k5 = 2α2  + α1  (β2  + β3  β1) (1 + β1 + β12 + 
β13),  where  α1,  α2,  β1 and  β2 are  those  given  in  Table  7.1,  while  leaving  the  constant  r 
unrestricted and then check if the estimated equation is meaningful and able to replicate the 
observed path of policy interest rates.
50 Collins and Siklos [2004] – within a different macroeconomic framework – do not assume a constant target 
real interest rate and take it to be given by the trend from an HP filter of the observed real rate. In this case,  
we would have to impose the restriction that the coefficients on the (time varying) r and on current inflation 
are equal. We have already discussed in Section 6 the pitfalls related to the use of HP filters; moreover, it is 
not unreasonable to imagine that, when there are no regime shifts or major policy or structural changes, the 
target real interest rate is constant.
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We estimated equation (7.9) by NLS and the estimated coefficients are reported in Table 7.4.
The results suggest that the Riksbank might have been pursuing interest rate stabilization and 
smoothing. Given that the weight on expected inflation is normalized to 1, we estimate that 
the relative weight on interest rate smoothing was over 41% and the weight on interest rate 
stabilization close to 8%. The target real rate over the sample period was 1.46. With respect to 
the previous case, the fit of the regression has largely improved, with the adjusted R2 going 
from 0.35 to 0.97.
7.4 Flexible Inflation Targeting
In the empirical counterpart of Section 5.3 we minimize (7.1) with respect to it setting λe = 0 
and k = 8. The interest rate rule resulting when we rearrange the FOC is: 
  it=
r
ir
r
i
ir
it−1
r
ir
t
8 k5
ir
t8∣t−
8y k 6
ir
y t8∣t           (7.10)
where k 5=221213111
21
3 ; k6=1
5 132 .
Again, the real exchange rate as well as foreign output and commodity inflation do not play a 
direct role in the Euler Equation but, being themselves predictors of inflation and,in particular, 
the output gap (which is endogenous in (7.10)), they should be included as instruments. As in 
the previous case, in order to achieve identification, we restrict k5 and k6 using the parameters 
estimated in the structural model, and limit ourselves to the estimation of the λ's and the target 
real rate. Column 5 in Table 7.3 shows the results for flexible inflation targeting.
According to our estimates, the Riksbank has not been following flexible IT. The coefficient 
on the expected output  gap is  positive but not significant and this  result  was robust to a 
different choice of the time horizon for output (in particular, setting the target for the output 
gap to be one year). The estimated target real interest rate is up to 2%.
This result suggests that the objective of “dampening fluctuations in the real economy” as 
stated in the Riksbank's monetary policy statement has probably been fulfilled by smoothing 
the interest rate and, at the same time, choosing a horizon for the inflation target which is 
longer than necessary, rather than by directly responding to the output gap.
Moreover, this result is consistent to what was obtained by Favero and Rovelli [2003] on the 
U.S. and Collins and Siklos [2004] on Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
7.5 Fear of Floating
The case of Fear of Floating is analyzed minimizing (7.1) with respect to it while leaving all 
λx unrestricted and setting k = 8. 
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Rearranging, and using (7.5) to get rid of the endogenous contemporaneous nominal exchange 
rate, the equation to be estimated by GMM is:
 it=
i
ir
it−1
r
ir
tr 
8 k 5
 ir
t8∣t−
8y k 6
ir
y t8∣t
e
ir
e t−1        (7.11)
where k1 and k2 are the same as in (7.10).
Column 7 in Table 7.3 shows the results of the GMM estimation of (7.11) when we assume 
that the objective function of the Central Bank is (7.1); since, in the previous section, we 
estimated λy to be insignificant, we also estimated (7.11) with λy = 0 and Column 8 shows the 
results for this alternative rule. 
The GMM estimation suggests  that  the Riksbank might indeed have put some weight on 
exchange rate stabilization; the relative weight in the objective function is quite small (2.6%) 
but  significant  at  all  levels.  However,  this  result  is  not  robust  to  the specification  of  the 
interest rate rule with λy = 0, since λe becomes insignificant. We can therefore conclude that 
“Fear of Floating” cannot describe the preferences of the Riksbank between 1995 and 2008 
well,  and thus the sources of the Krona/euro exchange rate stabilization have to be found 
somewhere else.
 
8. Conclusions
In this paper, I  have  proposed an approach to estimate Central Bank preferences within a 
small open economy starting from the monetary authority's optimization problem. When the 
official regime is Inflation Targeting, the issue of the role played by the exchange rate in the 
policy rule becomes relevant, and yet it has not received a definite answer so far. On one 
hand, the literature on inflation targeting suggests that the exchange rate can only play an 
indirect role in the interest rate rule as a predictor of inflation, because responding directly to 
exchange rate fluctuations would result in excessive interest rate fluctuations.
On the other hand, the literature on exchange rate regimes classification has shown that as far 
as the exchange rate policy is concerned, (small open economies) Central Banks'  de facto 
policies  often  deviate  from  the  de jure  regime,  and  this  ends  up  in  a situation, for many
countries with flexible exchange rates, of implicit exchange rate smoothing, that has been 
termed by Calvo and Reinhart [2002] “Fear of Floating”.
A CPI Inflation targeting regime can, as a side product, contribute to the stabilization of the 
exchange rate and therefore it can be hard to distinguish  it from a Fear of Floating regime just
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Table 7.4 Regression results
Estimated Equation
Optimal 
Coefficients Strict IT
Interest Rate 
Smoothing Flexible IT
Fear of 
Floating 1
Fear of 
Floating 2
k0
- -0.1709
(0.3713)
k1
1.000 1.5323a
(0.1487)
k2
91.11 0.8748a
(0.1502)
k3
8.041 0.1784a
(0.0589)
k4
2.255 0.5440a
(0.0624)
k5
0.208
(-)
0.208
(-)
0.208
(-)
0.208
(-)
k6
0.038
(-)
0.038
(-)
r 1.462
a
(0.309)
1.996a
(0.106)
2.865a
(0.186)
1.464a
(0.315)
λi
0.415a
(0.090)
0.268a
(0.028)
0.493a
(0.051)
0.415a
(0.091)
λr
0.078a
(0.019)
0.077a
(0.005)
0.070a
(0.006)
0.078a
(0.019)
λy
0.220
(0.150)
0.124
(0.220)
0
(-)
λe
0.026a
(0.005)
0.000
(0.010)
δ 0.984(-)
0.984
(-)
0.984
(-)
0.984
(-)
R2 0.360 0.967 0.958 0.953 0.953
Reg. SE 1.4117 0.325 0.361 0.382 0.382
D.W.
Stat.
0.5144 1.065 1.063
J-stat. 9.6484 0.201 0.238
Estimation Method GMM NLS GMM GMM NLS
HAC Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Instruments used in GMM: constant; πt-1,..., πt-4 ; yt-1,...,yt-4; it-1,...,it-4 ; Δwt-1 , … , Δ 
wt-4 ; rlt-1,..., rlt-4 ; Δ4Ct-1, … ,  Δ4Ct-4 , Δqt-2, … ,  Δqt-4
a estimated coefficient is sign. at 1%, b estimated coefficient is sign. at 5%, c estimated coefficient is sign. at 10%
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using the techniques suggested by the literature on exchange rate classification. By estimating 
Central Bank preferences using the approach suggested by Favero and Rovelli [2003] and 
Collins and Siklos [2004], we were able to bridge the gap between exchange rate regime 
classification schemes and the literature on the estimation of monetary policy rules including 
explicitly exchange rate smoothing in the Central Bank's objective function. At the same time, 
we  could  overcome  a  well-known  critique  on  Taylor  rule  coefficients:  since  they  are  a 
convolution  of  structural  and  preference  parameters,  they  cannot  be  given  a  structural 
interpretation. 
Sweden was the object of the empirical analysis for two main reasons: it has a history of 15 
years of Inflation Targeting and the exchange rate of its currency with the euro has shown a 
substantial  stability in the recent years,  raising the doubt that  some sort of exchange rate 
smoothing could have been in place. 
The results suggest that the Riksbank has been following a policy of Inflation Targeting with 
interest rate stabilization and smoothing, but not Fear of Floating.
The  stabilization  of  the  Krona/euro  exchange  rate  might  therefore  be  the  result  of  the 
convergence of the business cycles in the two regions, which made sure that the ECB and the 
Riksbank have been synchronizing their interest rate decisions, and this can be the object of 
further research on exchange rate stabilization.
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